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Abstract
In contrast to US companies, Chinese firms have concentrated ownership with the effect 
that the central agency problem emanates from controlling shareholders expropriating 
minority shareholders, a phenomenon referred to as ‘tunneling’. This study examines the 
monitoring effect of mutual funds on the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders. 
Due to the distinctive institutional settings in China, including a high level of ownership 
concentration, underdeveloped legal system in the stock markets and weak governance 
mechanisms in the mutual fund industry, we find that an increase in mutual fund owner-
ship effectively mitigates the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders thus improv-
ing firm performance. Nonetheless, after the mutual fund ownership reaches a certain 
threshold, an increase in concentrated mutual fund ownership is associated with heavier 
tunneling and lower firm performance. This may suggest that concentrated mutual funds 
collude with controlling shareholders in order to preserve their private interests. Moreover, 
the above effects are found to be more pronounced for firms with heavier tunneling activi-
ties. Our finding of the non-monotonic monitoring role of mutual funds brings attention 
to the private interest theory for mutual funds, an aspect that has been largely ignored in 
previous studies on mutual funds.
Keywords Mutual funds · Corporate governance · Tunneling · Firm performance · 
Nonlinearity · Ownership concentration
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1 Introduction
The governance role of institutional investors, particularly mutual funds, in monitoring 
managerial actions and improving firm performance has been well documented in the lit-
erature that covers developed countries (e.g., Cornett et al. 2007; Del Guercio and Hawkins 
1999; McConnell and Servaes 1990; Nesbitt 1994; Smith 1996), however, limited work 
has been devoted to major emerging economies such as China. The few studies that have 
been carried out to examine the monitoring role of mutual funds in China provide mixed 
evidence. Yuan et al. (2008) and Firth et al. (2016) report that mutual funds may enhance 
firm value and reduce agency costs in China. Nonetheless, using the split share structure 
reform1 as a research setting, Firth et al. (2010) show that mutual funds work together with 
the Chinese government to assist state-owned firms to complete the reform more quickly 
and at a relatively lower cost, instead of acting to maximize the returns to their unit holders. 
Ding et al. (2016) suggest that the presence of mutual funds hampers earnings informative-
ness of Chinese listed companies. Both Firth et al. (2010) and Ding et al. (2016) indicate 
that mutual funds are not yet capable of acting as an effective monitor in the Chinese stock 
markets. Such evidence is in sharp contrast to the effective monitoring role of mutual funds 
in developed countries as documented in the extant literature.
In the US, firms are normally characterized by dispersed ownership, a trait that has 
been observed to lead to the agency problem between firm managers and shareholders 
(e.g., Berle and Means 1932; Gul et al. 2010; Jensen and Meckling 1976). In contrast to 
the US situation, Chinese firms normally have concentrated ownership and, therefore, the 
central agency problem emanates from the controlling shareholders using their power to 
expropriate minority shareholders, a phenomenon commonly referred to as ‘tunneling’ 
(Johnson et al. 2000) or ‘self-dealing’ (Djankov et al. 2008). Such tunneling activities have 
been observed to have a significant detrimental effect on Chinese firms’ performance (see 
Cheung et al. 2006; Jiang et al. 2010; Wang and Xiao 2011).
Since 2000, the major regulatory efforts have been made by China to spur the develop-
ment of mutual funds, hoping to strengthen corporate governance and help stabilize the 
Chinese stock markets (China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 2000). Conse-
quently, mutual funds have been promoted as the largest and most important type of insti-
tutional investor in the Chinese stock markets. As pointed out earlier, improvements in cor-
porate governance including the eradication of tunneling behavior could be made through 
the active involvement of mutual funds. However, our knowledge on whether this is actu-
ally the case in China is still limited. Although two commendable studies that attempt to 
fill this void are by Yuan et  al. (2008) and Gao and Kling (2008), they do not consider 
the possible entrenched effects arising from mutual fund ownership concentration and only 
examine the monotonic predictions on the monitoring role of mutual funds.
In our study, we conjecture that the monitoring effects of mutual funds on constrain-
ing tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders and improving firm performance are 
1 Historically, the Chinese domestic A shares are separated into tradable and non-tradable shares with the 
latter mainly being held by the state. This split share structure leads to conflicts between tradable and non-
tradable shareholders, although both types of shares have the same cash flow and voting rights. To help 
solve this fundamental corporate governance problem, the Chinese government implemented a split share 
structure reform programme in April 2005 with the aim of converting non-tradable shares into tradable 
shares. Non-tradable shareholders need to compensate tradable shareholders in exchange for the listing 
rights of their shares. See Sect. 2.1 for more information on the Chinese stock market and the split share 
structure reform.
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non-linear. Our argument is based on two theoretical lenses, namely shareholder activism 
theory and the private benefits hypothesis. We also consider the distinctive institutional 
features in China, including a high level of ownership concentration, underdeveloped legal 
system and weak governance mechanisms in the mutual fund industry.
Below we structure our motivations in three aspects. First, motivated by Mehran and 
Stulz’s (2007) argument that financial institutions including mutual funds have complex 
incentives, face conflicts of interests and political pressure, and thus do not always serve 
as an effective monitor, we base our prediction on two competing arguments about mutual 
funds. On the one hand, mutual funds have the investment expertise, sophisticated skills 
and incentives to monitor managerial behavior and act as the representatives of minority 
shareholders, with the goal to maximize the value of the shares they hold (e.g., Yuan et al. 
2008, 2009). Relative to other institutional shareholders such as banks, insurance compa-
nies and securities companies, mutual funds have a greater exit threat of selling their shares 
(Aggarwal et al. 2015; Duan and Jiao 2016; Firth et al. 2016). Therefore, mutual funds act 
as an effective external corporate governance mechanism in their invested firms. On the 
other hand, mutual funds with concentrated ownership in their invested firms may care 
more about their own interests and wealth (Barclay et al. 1993), and are passive in play-
ing a monitoring role (Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Kim 1993; Velury and Jenkins 2006). 
As they would face higher exit costs, they are more likely to collude with the managers or 
controlling shareholders in order to preserve their private interests instead of threatening to 
exit.2 Similarly, Firth et al. (2010) argue that mutual funds are more prone to agency prob-
lems in China relative to their counterparts in the US, and suggest that mutual funds do not 
act as a guardian to protect individual (minority) investors during the split share structure 
reform. We assume that the above two competing views are not mutually exclusive, and 
conjecture that the monitoring role of mutual funds is likely to vary as mutual fund owner-
ship increases.
Second, China has a unique ownership structure where the presence of the dominant/
controlling shareholder in corporations is prevalent.3Moreover, contrary to the developed 
countries’ context, the legal environment in China is underdeveloped and the protection of 
minority shareholders is weak, which leads to the controlling shareholders gaining large 
private benefits from tunneling (Allen et al. 2005; Firth et al. 2007b; Shleifer and Vishny 
1997).4 In addition, the existence of the split share structure of Chinese firms further pro-
motes the tunneling activities of controlling shareholders as the movement of share prices 
has little effect on the wealth of controlling shareholders who hold non-tradable shares 
(Berkman et  al. 2009; Jiang et  al. 2010; Li 2010). As a consequence, the prevalence of 
tunneling is a distinct feature in China (Jiang et  al. 2010). Given that the Chinese stock 
markets have significantly different institutional environments (e.g., on the aspects of 
ownership concentration, legal systems and investor protection) from those of developed 
2 The mutual fund ownership in a Chinese firm can be large. For example, Firth et al. (2016) report that the 
largest mutual fund ownership in a firm in their sample is 66.5%. In this firm, the largest 10 shareholders 
include nine mutual funds. Also, Firth et al. (2010) point out that mutual funds frequently appear among the 
top 10 shareholders of many listed firms in China.
3 Highly concentrated ownership is prevalent among Chinese listed firms, with 40% of shares held by the 
largest shareholders (Allen et al. 2005).
4 La Porta et al. (1998) emphasize the importance of the legal system for protecting minority shareholders 
from expropriation by controlling shareholders.
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countries, conclusions drawn from previous research using the US data may not be directly 
applicable to China.5
Third and most importantly, compared with the mutual funds industry in the US, the 
governance mechanism in the Chinese mutual funds industry is much weaker. In developed 
countries, it is generally believed that mutual funds represent an effective monitoring party 
that fights hard to maximize firm performance and benefit the small individual investors. 
Although China has developed a thriving mutual funds industry that does not exist in many 
other developing countries; nonetheless, the mutual fund industry in China lacks the neces-
sary governance structure as well as voting right policy of mutual funds to ensure strong 
legal protection for minority investors (Firth et al. 2010; Huang 2006). More specifically, 
different from the mutual fund industry in the US, fund investors in China are simply the 
contractual and beneficial owners of mutual funds with few voting rights. It is difficult to 
remove a fund manager as no board of directors is in place to act as a fund governance 
mechanism in the Chinese mutual fund industry. Additionally—and more importantly—
mutual funds in China are not required to disclose the information regarding their votes.6 
Given the institutional environment setting of the Chinese stock markets and much weaker 
governance system in the Chinese mutual fund industry, we postulate that after a concen-
trated shareholding of mutual funds reaches a certain level, Chinese mutual funds may shift 
their attention to their own private interests. The effectiveness of their monitoring over 
controlling shareholders can be weakened as they may need to collude with controlling 
shareholders in order to pursue their own interests. Barclay et al. (1993) document a wide 
range of private benefits that are peculiar to mutual funds in various forms including pecu-
niary benefits (e.g., below-market transfer prices, preventing the opening of closed-end 
funds, etc.), underwriting or advisory contracts, and non-pecuniary benefits (e.g., access to 
private information, the influence on the political, social, or environmental policies of the 
firms, etc.). Consequently, we conjecture that the relationship between mutual fund owner-
ship and tunneling of controlling shareholders is nonlinear (i.e. concave).
For these reasons, we take a novel approach in explaining the governance role of mutual 
funds in Chinese firms. Moreover, we investigate the moderating effect of mutual fund 
ownership on the relationship between tunneling and performance of Chinese public listed 
companies. We conduct our empirical investigation using 15,131 firm-year observations 
over the sample period between 2003 and 2014. Following Jiang et al. (2010), Li (2010) 
and Liu and Lu (2007), tunneling behavior is measured by other receivables divided by 
total assets, which allows us to obtain a large number of observations. However, we also 
follow Ye (2006) and Wang and Xiao (2011) and use a more conservative measure of tun-
neling activities—i.e. other receivables of controlling shareholders divided by total assets, 
as a robustness check. Regarding firm performance, we employ five different measures 
including return on assets (ROA), return on equities (ROE), Tobin’s Q, returns on sales 
(ROS) and an operating performance indicator (OPINC_MV).
As opposed to the linear relationship discovered in the previous literature, we find a 
U-shaped association between mutual fund ownership and tunneling activities of control-
ling shareholders, and an inverted U-shaped association between mutual fund ownership 
and firm performance. The non-linear relationships imply that mutual funds can play a 
monitoring role by effectively constraining controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior 
5 The differences of institutional environments between Chinese stock markets and US stock markets are 
also well documented in prior literature (e.g., Lai and Tam 2017; Guo 2016).
6 More detailed discussion is given in Sect. 2.2.
Mutual funds, tunneling and firm performance: evidence from…
1 3
and in turn enhancing firm performance. However, beyond a certain level of mutual fund 
ownership, where mutual funds are more likely to collude with the controlling shareholders 
of their invested firms in order to preserve their private interests, mutual fund ownership 
is positively associated with tunneling and negatively associated with firm performance. 
These are consistent with our expectation and may result from the distinctive institutional 
features in China, including a high level of ownership concentration, underdeveloped legal 
system, and weak governance mechanisms in the mutual fund industry.
In addition, we investigate the moderating effect of mutual fund ownership and find that 
mutual funds enhance firm value more when a firm suffers from heavier tunneling, while 
concentrated mutual fund ownership elevates agency issues including tunneling and dimin-
ish firm performance. Our results are robust to alternative performance and tunneling meas-
ures, and a variety of approaches to deal with endogeneity. Therefore, we conclude that 
mutual funds are an effective guardian of minority investors to mitigate tunneling behavior 
and enhance firm value, as long as their ownership does not exceed a certain threshold, 
while concentrated mutual fund ownership may increase agency costs and weaken firm 
performance in the emerging market context.
Our research contributes to the literature by directly and comprehensively examining the 
roles that mutual funds play in restraining the controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior 
and whether mutual funds can improve firm performance via their impact on tunneling 
activities. Our non-linear theoretical predictions on the monitoring role of mutual funds 
extend the prior literature that is based upon the linear predictions. Our study also contrib-
utes to the debate about the promotion of mutual funds as an external monitor in China. It 
is timely given that the Chinese government has made a great deal of regulatory effort to 
develop mutual funds, and continues to do so. Our finding of the non-linear monitoring 
role of mutual funds provides new insights to policy makers and regulators on the corpo-
rate governance role of mutual funds in China. The study can lend empirical evidence to 
other emerging markets where the agency issue of tunneling arises from similar market 
features to those of China.7
2  Institutional background
2.1  Tunneling in China
In the early 1990s, the Chinese government established Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges in order to privatize its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and to introduce some 
elements of market discipline on top management of these firms. In the meantime, the gov-
ernment retained substantial ownership and maintained its control in many of these listed 
firms (Chen et al. 2008). As such, common stocks are classified into tradable and non-trad-
able shares. Most of the shares owned by the controlling shareholders belong to the non-
tradable shares category. As the trading of these shares is highly restricted, the controlling 
shareholders enjoy limited benefits of share price appreciation, and thus, are motivated to 
seek benefits through other channels. In addition to the fact that the Chinese stock markets 
have under-developed legal and regulatory systems and lack effective corporate governance 
7 The examples for the studies examining other emerging markets that share similar market features to 
those of China include Tee et al. (2019) and Ting (2013).
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mechanisms to protect individual investors from insider misconduct, the Chinese stock 
market environment is highly conducive to tunneling (e.g., Jiang et  al. 2010). Berkman 
et al. (2009) report that the controlling shareholders in the Chinese listed firms expropriate 
wealth from minority shareholders through loan guarantees to related parties. Jiang et al. 
(2010) suggest that inter-corporate loans are used by controlling shareholders as a tool to 
tunnel from listed companies in China.
To solve the issue of non-tradable shares, the Chinese government initiated the split 
share structure reform in 2005 to transfer non-tradable shares to tradable shares.8 This 
reform is expected to reduce the tunneling behavior of the controlling shareholders as they 
will be able to profit from capital gains and their wealth will be subject to the movement of 
their share prices after the reform. However, controlling shareholders in the SOEs still have 
strong incentives to engage in tunneling after the reform. Instead of the pure profit maxi-
mization focus, the SOEs have other social objectives such as to provide job opportunities, 
to directly control strategically important industries, and to divert private benefits. As a 
consequence, controlling shareholders in the SOEs have a natural tendency to tunnel from 
their listed firms (Peng et  al. 2011). Moreover, Liu and Tian (2012) suggest that for the 
non-SOEs, the controlling shareholders with excess control rights conduct tunneling rather 
than investing in new positive NPV projects, although the degree of tunneling has lessened 
after the split share structure reform. Huang (2016) finds that Chinese listed firms increase 
tunneling after the enterprise income tax reform in 2008.
2.2  Mutual funds in China
Most Chinese public firms have a dominant controlling shareholder (either state or pri-
vate),9 leaving minority shareholders little opportunity to have a direct influence on man-
agerial actions. By pooling the investments of diffuse individual investors, mutual funds 
become a potentially important corporate governance mechanism to protect minority inves-
tors from expropriation by controlling shareholders. In light of this, the CSRC has made 
substantial regulatory efforts since 2000 to promote mutual funds. According to the CSRC 
statistics, the mutual funds industry has experienced explosive development, with the num-
ber of mutual funds increasing from 218 in 2005 to 1897 in 2014, and the net asset value of 
the mutual fund industry increasing from around RMB 469 billion in 2005 to around RMB 
4535 billion in 2014.10 The level of mutual fund ownership in China is also comparable to 
that in the US (Yuan et al. 2008).
Huang (2006) and Firth et al. (2010) discuss the ways mutual funds are organized and 
governed in China and how this differs from their US counterparts. The main features are 
summarized below. Unlike the corporate-form mutual funds that prevail in the US markets, 
in the Chinese markets, all mutual funds are contractual-form funds whereby investors sign 
a contract with a fund management firm such that fund investors (i.e., unit holders) become 
the beneficial owners of the fund (Lu 2006). In contrast to the US, there is no board of 
10 See the website (available online at: http://www.amac.org.cn/tjsj/xysj/jjgss j/38782 4.shtml ) of the Asset 
Management Association of China (AMAC, an affiliated agency for CSRC).
8 Firms were selected in batches to conduct the conversion at different times.
9 Chinese listed firms initially had a state entity (e.g., central government, local government or government 
agencies) as a dominant controlling shareholder. Over time, through merger and acquisitions, private/family 
entities or individuals have become the controlling shareholders in many Chinese listed firms (e.g., Firth 
et al. 2010).
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directors to act as a fund governance body in China, which makes it difficult to remove 
a mutual fund manager. In addition, fund investors have fewer voting rights in China. In 
the situation that fund investors enjoy the voting rights, in reality, the rights are difficult to 
exercise due to stringent conditions that have to be met according to the law. Also, contrary 
to their counterparts in the US, Chinese mutual funds are not required to disclose informa-
tion relating to their votes. Hence, it is not transparent whether the mutual funds vote in a 
way that suits the best interests of the fund investors. Despite the explosive growth of the 
mutual funds industry in China, the interests of mutual funds may not always align with 
those of the minority shareholders, and sometimes the two may diverge significantly. Con-
sequently, mutual funds are more prone to agency problems in China than in the US.
3  Theories and hypothesis development
Drawing on two contrasting theoretical lenses, the corporate governance role of institu-
tional ownership has been studied extensively for many years. First, under the shareholder 
activism theory, Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Smith (1996), and Aggarwal et  al. (2011), 
amongst many other studies, link (certain types of) institutional ownership to various 
measures for corporate performance, and report that a high level of institutional ownership 
can increase shareholders’ wealth. In the same vein, Chung et al. (2002), Ramalingegowda 
and Yu (2012) and Sakaki et al. (2017) find that firms with higher institutional ownership 
shareholdings or stability conduct less earnings management, or report their accounts in 
a more conservative manner.11 The monitoring role of institutional investors is also docu-
mented in the contexts of auditing (e.g., Lim et  al. 2013) and the price informativeness 
(e.g., Luo et al. 2014).
Second, a relatively smaller body of literature, drawing on the private benefit hypoth-
esis, suggests that concentrated institutional ownership (block ownership) promotes rather 
than mitigates agency issues. Heflin and Shaw (2000) find that concentrated institutional 
ownership is positively associated with information asymmetry, and Bhojraj and Sengupta 
(2003) report that concentrated institutional ownership has a negative impact on bond rat-
ings and yields. Velury and Jenkins (2006) argue that concentrated institutional ownership 
may reduce earnings quality. Barclay et al. (1993) document a wide range of private ben-
efits that are peculiar to mutual funds in various forms including pecuniary benefits (e.g., 
below-market transfer prices, preventing the opening of closed-end funds, etc.), underwrit-
ing or advisory contracts, and non-pecuniary benefits (e.g., access to private information, 
the influence on the political, social, or environmental policies of the firms, etc.). There-
fore, despite being in a powerful position to influence managers or controlling sharehold-
ers, in order to preserve their private benefits, mutual funds with concentrated ownership 
are likely to collude with managers or controlling shareholders when facing agency issues.
Consequent to the aforementioned arguments, our initial hypotheses test the non-lin-
ear monitoring role of mutual funds by combining the shareholder activism theory and 
the private benefit hypothesis, which infers that mutual funds are an effective corporate 
governance mechanism when their ownership is below a certain threshold. However, due 
11 In line with these findings, Liu et  al. (2017) shows that mutual funds may be able to acquire private 
information by communicating with the managers of Chinese listed firms, and thus improve firm trans-
parency. A number of other studies that examine the similar research question include Lin and Manowan 
(2012) and Sakaki et al. (2017).
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to the distinctive institutional settings in China, including a high level of ownership con-
centration, underdeveloped legal system, and weak governance mechanisms in the mutual 
fund industry, when mutual fund ownership passes above the threshold, mutual funds are 
more likely to collude with controlling shareholders in order to preserve their self-interests 
instead of protecting minority shareholders in the Chinese stock markets. In light of the 
above arguments, we propose the following associations between mutual fund ownership, 
tunneling, and firm performance. First, we investigate the impact of mutual fund ownership 
on tunneling behavior. We conjecture that greater mutual fund ownership is associated with 
less tunneling of controlling shareholders, but greater concentrated mutual fund ownership 
is associated with more tunneling.
H1 The association between mutual fund ownership and tunneling follows a convex rela-
tion (U shape), as the level of mutual fund ownership increases.
Second, we examine the association between mutual funds and firm performance. We 
argue that, under (above) certain thresholds for mutual fund ownership, a positive (nega-
tive) association is expected between mutual fund ownership and firm performance.
H2 The association between mutual fund ownership and firm performance follows a con-
cave (inverted-U) relation, as the level of mutual fund ownership increases.
Third, we examine the interaction effects of mutual funds and tunneling on firm per-
formance. If mutual funds are an effective corporate governance mechanism, it will play a 
bigger role in firms that suffer from heavier tunneling, as reflected by a stronger association 
between mutual fund ownership and firm performance within such firms relative to oth-
ers. However, concentrated mutual fund ownership will elevate the agency issue of tun-
neling activities of controlling shareholder but diminish firm performance, as reflected by 
a weaker association between mutual fund ownership and firm performance for firms with 
more tunneling activities. Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses:
H3 (a) The incremental effect of mutual fund ownership on firm performance is stronger 
for firms with heavier tunneling behavior.
H3 (b) The incremental effect of mutual fund ownership on firm performance is weaker 
for firms with heavier tunneling behavior when mutual fund ownership is higher than a cer-
tain level (i.e., follows a concave (inverted-U) relation), as the level of mutual fund owner-
ship increases.
4  Methodology
4.1  Logistic models
To investigate our first hypothesis (H1) on the association between mutual fund ownership 
and tunneling, we adopt the following logistic model:
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The dependent variable, DTUL, is the likelihood of heavy tunneling behavior conducted 
by the controlling shareholders. It is equal to 1 if a firm’s tunneling activities, TUL, are 
equal to or above the average value of TUL of all firms in the current year, and 0 otherwise. 
Following Jiang et al. (2010) and Li (2010), TUL is measured by other receivables divided 
by total assets. Following Yuan et al. (2008), mutual fund ownership INS_PER is measured 
in two ways: the percentage of mutual funds in total common shares at the year-end (i.e., 
MF_PER) and the ratio of the market value of mutual funds-held shares to the total market 
value of a firm at the year-end (i.e., MF_MV_PER). INS_PER_2 is the squared value of 
INS_PER. We expect a negative coefficient on INS_PER ( 훼1 < 0) and a positive coefficient 
on INS_PER_2 ( 훼2 > 0) if a convex association between mutual fund ownership and the 
tunneling behavior holds as the level of mutual fund ownership increases.
Based upon the findings of Berkman et al. (2009), Jiang et al. (2010), and Wang and 
Xiao (2011), we include a set of control variables such as the lag value of return-on-assets 
(ROA_LAG), leverage (LEVERAGE), the book-to-market ratio (BM), and firm size (FIRM-
SIZE). We further control for two items in Eq. (1) including the percentage of shares held 
by controlling shareholders (Top_1)12 and a dummy indicating whether a firm’s largest 
shareholder is the state or not (STATE).13
4.2  Multivariate models
To test our second hypothesis (H2) on the association between mutual fund ownership and 
firm performance, we estimate the following regression:
Regarding our hypotheses (H3 (a) and H3 (b)) on the incremental effect of mutual fund 
ownership on the relationship between tunneling and firm performance, we construct the 
following regression model:
(1)
DTULi,t = 훼1INS_PERi,t + 훼2INS_PER_2i,t + 훼3TOP_1i,t + 훼4STATEi,t
+ 훼5ROAi,t−1 + 훼6LEVERAGEi,t + 훼7BMi,t + 훼8FIRMSIZEi,t
(2)
FirmPeformancei,t = 훼0 + 훼1INS_PERi,t + 훼2INS_PER_2i,t + 훼3PAYi,t
+ 훼4TOP_1i,t + 훼5INDi,t + 훼6DSUP_NUMi,t
+ 훼7BIG4i,t + 훼8TSi,t−1 + 훼9REFORMi,t
+ 훼10RET_ADJi,t−1 + 훼11STATEi,t
+ 훼12LEVERAGEi,t−1 + 훼13SGRi,t + 훼14BMi,t
+ 훼15FIRMSIZEi,t
12 The evidence regarding the impact of controlling shareholder ownership on tunneling is mixed in the lit-
erature. La Porta et al. (2002) and Claessens et al. (2002) suggest that controlling shareholders with higher 
cash-flow rights engage in less tunneling than others. Berkman et al. (2009) and Peng et al. (2011) do not 
report a significant coefficient on the controlling shareholder ownership in their study of China.
13 Jian and Wong (2010) demonstrate that state-owned firms are more likely to pursue their own benefits by 
expropriating from minority shareholders. On the contrary, Jiang et al. (2010) find that state-owned firms 
are less likely to tunnel. In addition, Jiang et  al. (2010) and Wang and Xiao (2011) report that the state 
dummy has no significant impact on tunneling.
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We adopt five firm performance measures that are commonly used in the literature; 
these are (1) ROA (earnings before interests and tax divided by total assets), (2) ROE (total 
profit divided by book value of equity), (3) Tobin’s Q (market value of assets over book 
value of assets), (4) ROS (earnings before interests and tax divided by net sales), and (5) 
OPINC_MV (operating income divided by market value of assets).14
We expect a positive coefficient on INS_PER ( 훼1 > 0) and a negative coefficient on INS_
PER_2 ( 훼2 < 0) in Eqs. (2)–(3) to support our hypothesis (H2) that the impacts of mutual 
fund ownership on firm performance follow a concave (inverted-U) shape. To test our 
hypotheses (H3 (a) and (b)) on the incremental effects of mutual fund ownership over tun-
neling on firm performance, we interact the tunneling proxy TUL with the mutual fund 
ownership measures INS_PER and their squared values (INS_PER_2). We expect a posi-
tive coefficient on the interaction term TUL × INS_PER ( a4 > 0) and a negative coefficient 
on the interaction term TUL × INS_PER_2 ( a5 < 0)—i.e., a concave (inverted-U) shape of 
association.
We account for the effects of five corporate governance variables comprising: execu-
tive compensation (PAY), largest shareholder ownership (TOP_1), the percentage of inde-
pendent director (IND), a dummy capturing firms with a larger supervisory board (DSUP_
NUM), and a dummy capturing the use of Big 4 auditors (BIG4) in our analysis. We take 
the natural logarithm of total compensation received by board of directors, supervisors 
and executives as a proxy for executive compensation. Consistent with agency theory, we 
expect executive compensation to be positively associated with firm performance in China 
(e.g., Conyon and He 2011; Firth et al. 2006). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that the 
substantial shareholding of large shareholders can constrain managerial opportunism and 
improve performance in corporations with a large number of minority shareholders. Fol-
lowing Gul et al. (2010), we include the largest shareholder ownership as measured by the 
percentage of shares held by the top shareholder (TOP1). Based upon the literature on the 
possible monitoring role of independent directors on executive board-level directors (e.g., 
Masulis and Mobbs 2014), we control for the percentage of independent directors on the 
board (IND). Listed firms in China have a supervisory board in addition to the main board 
of directors. Nonetheless, whether supervisory boards play an active and effective monitor-
ing role in practice is inconclusive (e.g., Firth et al. 2007b; Jia et al. 2009; Xi 2006). To 
control for the possible impact of supervisory board on firm performance, we include a 
dummy equal to 1 if the number of supervisors in a firm is greater than the median value 
of our sampled firms in the current year (DSUP_NUM). Fan and Wong (2005) and Gul 
et  al. (2010) find that Big 4 auditors help to protect minority shareholders in emerging 
(3)
FirmPerformancei,t = 훼0 + 훼1INS_PERi,t + 훼2INS_PER_2i,t + 훼3TULi,t
+ 훼4TULi,t × INS_PERi,t + 훼5TULi,t × INS_PER_2i,t
+ 훼6PAYi,t + 훼7TOP_1i,t + 훼8INDi,t + 훼9DSUP_NUMi,t
+ 훼10BIG4i,t + 훼11TSi,t−1 + 훼12REFORMi,t
+ 훼13RET_ADJi,t−1 + 훼14STATEi,t + 훼15LEVERAGEi,t−1
+ 훼16SGRi,t + 훼17BMi,t + 훼18FIRMSIZEi,t
14 All of these five variables have been widely used in the literature to measure firm performance (e.g., 
Yuan et al. 2008; Chen et al. 2008, 2009, among many others).
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markets where firms normally have concentrated shareholding ownership structures, as Big 
4 auditors may push their clients to disclose more detailed, higher-quality and timely firm-
specific information. Therefore, we include a dummy indicating the use of Big 4 auditors 
by a firm to capture their monitoring effects (BIG4).
We further control for, and briefly describe below, eight firm-specific variables in 
Eqs. (2)–(3); these are the percentage of tradable shares (TS), a split share structure reform 
dummy (REFORM), market-adjusted stock returns (RET-ADR), a state dummy (STATE), 
leverage (LEVERAGE), sales growth rate (SGR), book-to-market ratio (BM), and firm size 
(SIZE). We use the percentage of tradable shares of a firm (TS) to measure the firm’s free-
float shares in the stock market. The movement of share prices in the capital market matters 
more to firms with a larger proportion of free-float shares and, thus, might encourage con-
trolling shareholders to improve firm performance (e.g., Kuo et al. 2014; Li et al. 2011). 
As a consequence, Hou et al. (2012) and Kuo et al. (2014) find that the split share structure 
reform induces an incentive alignment effect of shifting the controlling shareholders’ atten-
tion from maximizing their own benefits to maximizing firm value. Therefore, we control 
for the effects of the split share reform by including the REFORM dummy which is set to 
one for the period after a listed firm was chosen to complete the reform. Following Cor-
nett et al. (2007) and Yuan et al. (2008), we control for prior year’s market-adjusted stock 
returns (RET-ADR) that reflect the market’s expectation of future firm performance and 
the likelihood that mutual funds select well-performing firms to invest in. Previous studies 
find that state ownership contributes to corporate operational inefficiency and thus is nega-
tively associated with firm performance (e.g., Dewenter and Malatesta 2001; Gul 1999; 
Yuan et al. 2008).15 Accordingly, we include a state dummy variable (STATE) to capture its 
effects on firm performance.
Whether and how leverage affects firm performance is inclusive in empirical findings 
for China (e.g., Qi et al. 2000; Sun and Tong 2003; Yuan et al. 2008), and thus we con-
trol for any possible impact of leverage by using total debt divided by total assets (LEV-
ERAGE). Sales growth, which captures a firm’s future growth prospects and investment 
opportunities, is found to be positively associated with firm performance for Canadian, 
European, and East Asian markets (Claessens et al. 2002; King and Santor 2008; Maury 
2006). As such, we include sales growth rate (SGR) as a determinant for firm performance, 
and we compute the ratio of changes in sales between year t and t − 1 divided by sales in 
year t as the proxy for sales growth rate. We also include the book-to-market ratio (BM) to 
account for the effect of market prospects, following Lie (2005) and Fan et al. (2007). Firm 
size is found to have a negative impact on firm performance in China as larger firms may 
suffer from more agency problems, attract more bureaucratic intervention, and operate less 
efficiently than small firms (e.g., Sun and Tong 2003; Yuan et al. 2008). Accordingly, we 
control for firm size (SIZE) as measured by the natural logarithm of total assets in our mod-
els. Definitions of the variables used in this study are given in the “Appendix”.
4.3  Unexplained tunneling behavior: the two‑stage least squares (2SLS) analysis
We also adopt a two-stage regression procedure to mitigate the endogeneity concern 
that tunneling, mutual fund ownership, and firm performance might be affected by some 
15 However, Jiang et al. (2010) suggest that state-owned firms in the Chinese market are likely to engage in 
fewer tunneling activities.
 A. Chizema et al.
1 3
common factors such as ownership structure and firm characteristics. In particular, we 
examine whether mutual fund ownership is effective in improving performance for firms 
engaging in unexplained tunneling behavior. To do so, we examine whether mutual fund 
ownership remains effective in improving performance for firms engaging in unexplained 
tunneling behavior after controlling for common factors. Following Wang and Xiao (2011), 
we first model tunneling as a function of its determinants as proposed by Jiang et al. (2010) 
and Jian and Wong (2010), including largest shareholder ownership (TOP_1), state owner-
ship (STATE), prior year’s return-on-assets (ROA), leverage (LEVERAGE), book-to-market 
ratio (BM), firm size (FIRMSIZE), and lagged value of tunneling (TUL). The correspond-
ing regression is:
The residuals from Model (4) capture the unexplained tunneling behavior conducted by 
controlling shareholders. In the second stage, we construct a dummy variable (UNEXP_
TUL), which equals to 1 if the unexplained tunneling is greater than the mean value of the 
sampled observations, and 0 otherwise. We re-estimate our Model (3) by replacing TUL 
with UNEXP_TUL, and re-examine our hypotheses.
4.4  Data and sample
Our sample comprises 15,131 firm-year observations, which represents 2430 listed firms 
on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2003 to 2014. Our sample period starts 
from 2003 when the shareholder information became comprehensively available. The data 
used in our study are collected from the China Securities Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) databases. In particular, we use the China Funds Market Research Database-
Open-end-Funds and Close-end-Funds, a part of CSMAR, to collect data for mutual fund 
ownership which we define as the sum of open-end-fund ownership and close-end-fund 
ownership for each listed company. As mentioned above, we follow Jiang et al. (2010) to 
use ‘other receivables’ deflated by total assets to measure the tunneling through intercor-
porate lending. As a robustness check, we also adopt an alternative definition of tunneling 
based upon Wang and Xiao (2011) which is the cash transferred from listed firms to their 
controlling shareholders (TUL_LAR). The data for this variable is collected from China 
Listed Firms’ Related Party Transactions Research Database in CSMAR.
Table  1 provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study. In Panel A, 
we report similar mean and median values for the performance indicators ROA, ROE, ROS 
and Tobin’s Q to those found in other studies on the Chinese markets that also adopt these 
performance measures (i.e., Jiang et al. 2010; Peng et al. 2011). Additionally, we report an 
average value of 0.029 on our additional operating performance indicator OPINC_MV. The 
mean value for our tunneling proxy (TUL), 0.027, is lower than the annual mean figures 
reported by Jiang et al. (2010). This could be explained by different sample periods exam-
ined in these two studies. The CSRC acknowledged the severity of the tunneling problem 
and has issued a series of corresponding rules and regulations since 2001. In particular, 
one rule issued in 2005 targets controlling shareholders and requests all the loans reported 
(4)
TULi,t = 훼0 + 훼1TOP_1i,t + 훼2STATEi,t + 훼3ROAi,t−1 + 훼4LEVERAGEi,t + 훼5BMi,t + 훼6FIRMSIZEi,t
+ 훼7TULi,t−1
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in ‘other receivables’ from controlling entities and affiliates to be repaid by December 31, 
2006.16 Consequently, we expect tunneling to fall after 2005. Different from Jiang et  al. 
(2010) and other prior studies on tunneling in China whose sample periods stop before or in 
2005, our study investigates a much longer period to reflect the existence of tunneling activi-
ties after 2005 though at a smaller scale. However, the mean value of other receivables of 
firms’ controlling shareholders (TUL_LAR) is 0.014, close to the results reported by Wang 
and Xiao (2011). The average aggregate mutual fund holding is 4.7% of the total shares 
in issue (i.e., tradable plus non-tradable shares).17 More than half of Chinese listed firms 
in our sample are state-owned enterprises, as the average of STATE is 0.558. The largest 
shareholder’s ownership, TOP_1, has a mean (median) value of 38% (36%), suggesting the 
prevalence of the concentrated ownership structure amongst Chinese listed firms.
Panel B of Table 1 presents year-by-year summary statistics for the variable TUL which 
shows a declining trend of tunneling from 0.061 in 2005 to 0.023 in 2014. This confirms 
the effectiveness of the regulations on reducing tunneling. However, Jiang et  al. (2010) 
conjecture that, in an environment with concentrated ownership structure and weak legal 
enforcement, regulations alone are not enough to prohibit tunneling. We show evidence 
supporting this argument.
Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in the study. 
The results imply that the two mutual fund ownership measures (MF_PER and MF_MV_
PER) are both positively correlated with each of our adopted firm performance measures. 
Consistent with Yuan et al. (2008), we also find a significantly positive correlation between 
mutual fund ownership and firms’ market-adjusted returns (RET_ADJ). This indicates that 
mutual funds either invest in firms with good future performance prospects or can improve 
firm performance. Furthermore, the tunneling proxy, TUL, has a significant and negative 
correlation with all firm performance measures except for Tobin’s Q, which is consistent 
with Gao and Kling (2008), Berkman et  al. (2009), and Jiang et  al. (2010). In addition, 
there is a significant and negative correlation between mutual fund ownership and the tun-
neling proxy; this implies that mutual funds play a corporate governance role to restrict 
tunneling activities of Chinese firms. Overall, the correlation coefficients do not alert us to 
potential multicollinearity issues in our regression analysis.
5  Empirical results
5.1  Tunneling behavior and mutual fund ownership
Table 3 provides the results of logistic regression models that we use to test whether mutual 
fund ownership can effectively mitigate the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders 
in the Chinese listed firms. The dependent variable in these models is a dummy capturing 
whether a firm conducts heavy tunneling activities or not, DTUL. We report significantly 
negative coefficients on mutual fund ownership variables (MF_PER and MF_MV_PER), 
and significantly positive coefficients on the squared value of mutual fund ownership 
16 Some of the top management of controlling entities who failed to resolve their loans by the deadline 
were arrested (Jiang et al. 2010).
17 Firth et al. (2010) show that mutual fund is the largest institutional investor in tradable shares (i.e., the 
average aggregate mutual fund holding is about 76% of all the institutional tradable shareholdings).
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Table 1  Summary statistics and tunneling
Variable Obs. Mean Median SD Min P25 P75 Max
Panel A: summary statistics
ROA 15,131 0.039 0.036 0.053 − 0.184 0.014 0.065 0.156
ROA_ADJ 15,131 0.004 0.002 0.052 − 0.215 − 0.019 0.030 0.122
ROE 15,075 0.069 0.073 0.108 − 0.437 0.031 0.121 0.278
ROE_ADJ 15,075 0.001 0.004 0.106 − 0.497 − 0.035 0.052 0.209
ROS 15,131 0.115 0.094 0.155 − 0.589 0.047 0.172 0.589
ROS_ADJ 15,131 0.014 0.001 0.147 − 0.689 − 0.044 0.069 0.443
TOBIN_Q 15,131 1.662 1.298 1.074 0.414 0.998 1.979 5.404
TOBIN_Q_ADJ 15,131 0.230 − 0.012 0.972 − 1.034 − 0.284 0.450 3.679
OPNIC 15,131 0.029 0.028 0.043 − 0.131 0.010 0.050 0.122
OPNIC_ADJ 15,131 0.003 0.003 0.042 − 0.156 − 0.015 0.023 0.093
MF_PER 15,131 0.047 0.015 0.068 0.000 0.002 0.063 0.267
MF_MV_PER 15,131 0.047 0.014 0.072 0.000 0.002 0.060 0.290
TUL 15,131 0.027 0.011 0.046 0.000 0.004 0.028 0.318
DTUL 15,131 0.282 0.000 0.450 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
TUL_LAR 7504 0.014 0.001 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.305
PAY 15,131 8.080 12.562 6.608 0.000 0.014 13.667 16.794
TOP_1 15,131 0.377 0.361 0.155 0.119 0.250 0.497 0.708
IND 15,131 0.363 0.333 0.054 0.000 0.333 0.375 0.800
DSUP_NUM 15,131 0.951 1.000 0.217 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
BIG4 15,131 0.075 0.000 0.263 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
TS 15,131 0.672 0.650 0.269 0.025 0.431 0.997 1.000
REFORM 15,131 0.587 1.000 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
RET_ADJ 15,131 0.056 − 0.027 0.447 − 0.776 − 0.199 0.228 1.423
STATE 15,131 0.558 1.000 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
LEVERAGE 15,131 0.471 0.481 0.203 0.080 0.317 0.624 0.970
SGR 15,131 0.084 0.123 0.340 − 2.852 0.003 0.236 0.817
BM 15,131 0.443 0.390 0.283 − 0.381 0.243 0.581 5.000
FIRMSIZE 15,131 21.922 21.759 1.209 18.806 21.054 22.603 25.985
MAK 6298 8.236 8.330 2.053 0.380 6.610 10.180 11.800
Year Obs. Mean Median Std P25 P75
Panel B: tunneling behavior by year
2003 1253 0.060 0.025 0.083 0.006 0.074
2004 1341 0.060 0.021 0.087 0.005 0.072
2005 1342 0.061 0.022 0.089 0.005 0.070
2006 1414 0.050 0.017 0.081 0.004 0.053
2007 1522 0.042 0.013 0.071 0.004 0.042
2008 1574 0.038 0.013 0.065 0.004 0.038
2009 1727 0.032 0.012 0.060 0.004 0.031
2010 2072 0.027 0.009 0.053 0.003 0.026
2011 2305 0.026 0.010 0.050 0.004 0.024
2012 2425 0.024 0.010 0.043 0.004 0.024
2013 2471 0.023 0.010 0.041 0.004 0.024
2014 2590 0.023 0.010 0.041 0.005 0.023
To be comparable with other studies, we report the tunneling of all listed firm in the Chinese market year by 
year
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(MF_PER_2 and MF_MV_PER_2) in these models.18 These results support H1 that mutual 
funds monitor controlling shareholders’ behavior by preventing them from expropriating 
minority shareholders, whereas concentrated mutual funds are more likely to collude with 
controlling shareholders to conduct tunneling for their private interests.19
Given the estimated values for the coefficients of the mutual fund ownership varia-
bles (MF_PER and MF_PER_2), we calculate the turning points of the relation between 
Table 3  Relation between mutual fund ownership and tunneling behavior
All variables are as defined in the “Appendix”. The sample period is between 2003 and 2014. The depend-
ent variable is the likelihood of expropriation of the minority shareholder’s interest by the controlling share-
holder. This paper uses industry dummies to control for the industry effect according to the CSRC industrial 
codes, and controls for the year dummy as well. The coefficients and t-stats are computed using heterosce-
dasticity consistent standard errors. T statistics are in parentheses; *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Dependent variable DTUL DTUL
MF_PER − 4.573***
(− 4.748)
MF_PER_2 12.909***
(3.323)
MF_MV_PER − 3.424***
(− 3.689)
MF_MV_PER_2 8.530**
(2.469)
TOP_1 − 1.768*** − 1.745***
(− 12.389) (− 12.284)
STATE 0.167*** 0.168***
(3.730) (3.738)
ROA_LAG − 5.830*** − 5.922***
(− 11.590) (− 11.739)
LEVERAGE 1.780*** 1.771***
(13.367) (13.155)
BM − 0.450*** − 0.431***
(− 3.617) (− 3.425)
FIRMSIZE − 0.223*** − 0.234***
(− 8.004) (− 8.424)
Year dummy Y Y
Industry dummy Y Y
Observations 15,129 15,129
18 In untabulated results, we also replace the two mutual fund ownership variables and their squared values 
by their lagged values to avoid the potential endogeneity, and the results remain consistent. We also use the 
standardised value of the mutual fund ownership variable and rerun the estimations as a robustness check. 
The results remain materially unchanged.
19 We also replace the heavy tunneling dummy, DTUL, with value of tunneling, TUL, for the dependent 
variable. The results remain materially unchanged. For brevity, the results are not reported here but are 
available upon request.
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mutual fund ownership and the heavy tunneling dummy, DTUL, and find the values 
of the turning points to be within a range of 15–20% across different model specifica-
tions.20 Nonetheless, the estimated ‘turning point’ should not be over-interpreted, as no 
theoretical prediction exists in relation to the specific ownership level at which this will 
occur. Rather, it is an empirical outcome by assuming the co-existence of the monitor-
ing and private interest incentives of mutual funds. More importantly, the existence of 
the turning points supports the prediction of this study and provides evidence contrary 
to the linear prediction of monitoring effects of mutual funds as documented in prior 
literature.
Table 3 shows that the estimated coefficients on the ownership of largest shareholder 
(TOP_1) are significantly negative at the 1% level. This is consistent with Jiang et  al. 
(2010) and implies that a firm with larger controlling shareholder ownership is less likely 
to engage in heavy tunneling. The coefficients on the dummy capturing state-owned firms 
(STATE) are positive and significant at the 1% level. This evidence is consistent with state-
owned firms being more likely to tunnel large resources out of a company as reported by 
Jian and Wong (2010). Also, similar to Jiang et  al. (2010) and Wang and Xiao (2011), 
controlling shareholders’ tunneling decreases with prior firm performance (ROA_LAG) 
and size (FIRMSIZE), but increases with firm leverage (LEVERAGE) and growth prospects 
(e.g., lower BM).
5.2  Mutual fund ownership, tunneling and firm performance
Table 4 shows the results of the regression models used to test our H2 when MF_PER is 
employed as the measure of mutual fund ownership. The results show that the positive 
coefficients of mutual fund ownership are significant at the 1% level across all regressions 
and the negative coefficients of their squared values are significant across all the firm per-
formance measures adopted, except for TOBIN_Q. The finding supports our H2 of a con-
cave relationship between mutual fund ownership and firm performance. The results sug-
gest that an increase in mutual funds can enhance the effectiveness of their monitoring 
effect and in turn improve firm performance, while concentrated mutual funds collude with 
corporate controlling shareholders and in turn reduce their firm’s value when their share-
holding is higher than a threshold level.21 We also calculate the turning points of this con-
cave relationship across various model specifications, and find that the value ranges from 
16% to 26% of mutual fund ownership.22
Regarding the results of the control variables, the coefficient of CEO compensation 
(PAY) is positive and significant for all performance measures except for Tobin’s Q. This 
is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Conyon and He 2011; Firth et al. 2006, 2007a; Ozkan 
2011; Shleifer and Vishny 1997) and implies that CEO compensation serves as an effec-
tive motivation for the CEO to improve firm performance. We find that, consistent with the 
20 In our sample, approximately 22% (14%) of companies have a mutual fund ownership of 15% (20%) or 
above.
21 On page 476 of Petersen (2009), it gives suggestions on how to identify whether firm/time/both effect(s) 
exist in dataset before choosing a suitable estimation approach. Following these suggestions, in untabulated 
results, we find that standard errors clustered by firm are larger than white standard errors. This indicates 
the existence of firm effect and thus it is suitable to use firm fixed effect estimation approach or standard 
errors clustered by firm, as the Fama–MacBeth standard errors would be biased.
22 In our sample, approximately 8.5% of companies have a mutual fund ownership of 26% or above.
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Table 4  Relation between mutual fund ownership and firm performance
All variables are as defined in the “Appendix”. The sample period is between 2003 and 2014. The depend-
ent variables are the proxies of firm performance, which are represented by ROA, ROE, ROS, TOBIN_Q 
and OPNIC, respectively. To reduce the effects of multicollinearity, the component variables of the inter-
action terms are standardized before being entered into the regression analysis. This paper uses industry 
dummies to control for the industry effect according to the CSRC industrial codes, and controls for the 
year dummy as well. The coefficients and t-stats are computed using heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors. T statistics are in parentheses; *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Dependent variable ROA ROE ROS TOBIN_Q OPINC
MF_PER 0.346*** 0.698*** 0.587*** 3.087*** 0.282***
(20.888) (19.470) (11.256) (9.570) (20.399)
MF_PER_2 − 0.675*** − 1.390*** − 1.608*** 0.181 − 0.865***
(− 10.455) (− 10.393) (− 7.917) (0.137) (− 16.788)
PAY 0.010*** 0.022*** 0.015*** − 0.008 0.007***
(14.717) (14.271) (6.693) (− 0.910) (13.537)
TOP_1 0.039*** 0.082*** 0.028*** 0.140*** 0.031***
(14.547) (13.773) (3.215) (3.211) (13.022)
IND − 0.017** − 0.028* − 0.024 0.639*** − 0.010
(− 2.233) (− 1.716) (− 0.994) (5.449) (− 1.564)
DSUP_NUM 0.006*** 0.010** 0.018** 0.057** 0.005***
(2.655) (2.119) (2.548) (2.399) (2.847)
BIG4 0.006*** 0.008** 0.004 0.149*** 0.007***
(3.656) (2.523) (0.708) (6.080) (4.243)
TS − 0.007*** − 0.020*** − 0.044*** 0.200*** − 0.008***
(− 4.124) (− 5.154) (− 7.484) (5.722) (− 4.858)
REFORM 0.009*** 0.020*** 0.044*** − 0.020 0.012***
(8.496) (8.926) (12.969) (− 1.079) (12.434)
RET_ADJ 0.013*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.280*** 0.008***
(13.312) (12.610) (8.388) (15.747) (10.442)
STATE − 0.005*** − 0.012*** − 0.015*** − 0.042*** − 0.005***
(− 5.866) (− 6.012) (− 5.350) (− 3.054) (− 6.579)
LEVERAGE − 0.091*** − 0.066*** − 0.201*** − 1.409*** − 0.048***
(− 36.410) (− 11.194) (− 23.231) (− 28.288) (− 24.013)
SGR 0.035*** 0.072*** 0.073*** − 0.021 0.028***
(18.470) (16.475) (8.570) (− 0.952) (20.156)
BM − 0.010*** − 0.016*** 0.002 − 1.177*** 0.015***
(− 4.651) (− 3.534) (0.359) (− 16.696) (7.436)
FIRMSIZE 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.017*** − 0.257*** 0.007***
(6.174) (6.551) (9.254) (− 20.866) (14.539)
Intercept − 0.008 − 0.106*** − 0.194*** 7.571*** − 0.110***
(− 0.759) (− 4.311) (− 5.432) (32.911) (− 11.825)
Year dummy Y Y Y Y Y
Industry dummy Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.374 0.277 0.241 0.601 0.277
Observations 13,962 13,905 13,962 13,962 13,962
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literature, the ownership of the largest shareholder (TOP_1) is positively associated with 
firm performance.23 We report mixed findings for the impact of independent directors on 
firm performance, as the signs and significance of coefficients on the percentage of inde-
pendent directors (IND) are sensitive to the definition for firm performance. The existence 
of a larger supervisory board and the recruitment of Big 4 auditing firms are, in general, 
positively associated with firm performance. More tradable shares (TS) in the ownership 
structure are positively associated with Tobin’s Q, implying the possibility of overvaluation 
for these shares, but are negatively associated with all other firm performance measures. 
The reform dummy is positively associated with firm performance measures except for 
Tobin’s Q, implying that the reform improves firm performance by converting non-tradable 
shares to tradable shares. Consistent with Yuan et al. (2008), firms with a higher market-
adjusted return in prior year (RET_ADJ) is more likely to show a better performance for all 
measures. Accordingly, the inclusion of prior year’s stock return could mitigate the concern 
that mutual funds choose to invest in firms with good prospects (Yuan et al. 2008). In addi-
tion, we find that state-owned firms and firms with higher leverage are less likely to achieve 
a better performance, whereas firms with good growth and market prospects, as captured 
by higher sales growth rate and lower book-to-market ratio are more likely to realise a bet-
ter performance than other firms in general. Similar to the findings of Chen et al. (2009), 
Firth et al. (2006) and Wu et al. (2012), firm size is positively and significantly associated 
with all firm performance measures except for Tobin’s Q.
Table 5 displays the results of the regression models that we use to test H2 and H3 (a) 
and (b). To reduce the effects of multicollinearity, the component variables of the interac-
tion terms between the tunneling measure (TUL) and the mutual fund ownership measures 
are standardized before being entered to the regression analysis, following Jaccard et  al. 
(1990).
Our second hypothesis (H2) is supported by the significantly positive coefficients of the 
mutual fund ownership variables and the significantly negative coefficients of their squared 
values across all adopted firm performance measures. The non-linear association between 
mutual fund ownership and firm performance is consistent with our expectations that 
mutual funds have the ability and incentives to monitor corporate management and thus 
to improve firm performance; but that concentrated mutual funds would be more likely 
to collude with corporate management or controlling shareholders rather than playing a 
guardianship role to protect minority shareholders, which leads to a decline of firm value.
In line with previous studies, we find that the tunneling severity is negatively associated 
with firm performance, as the coefficients of TUL are significantly negative at the 1% level 
across all employed models except for Tobin’s Q. Moreover, consistent with our conjecture, 
we report significantly positive coefficients on the interaction terms of TUL and mutual 
fund ownership measures, and significantly negative coefficients on the interaction terms 
of TUL and the squared values of mutual fund ownership indicators. The results are robust 
for all adopted firm performance measures, and thus support our H3 (a)—that the external 
monitoring of mutual fund ownership is exogenous and generates more improvement in 
performance for firms with more tunneling activities, and H3 (b)—that the incremental 
effect of mutual fund ownership over a firm’s tunneling activities on a firm’s performance 
23 We also include the Herfindahl index calculated as the sum of the squared percentage of shares held by 
the top 10 shareholders (HERF) in the regressions, as used by Aggarwal et al. (2015) and Firth et al. (2016). 
The results are materially unchanged. For brevity, the results are not reported but available upon request.
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Table 5  Relation between mutual fund ownership, tunneling behavior and firm performance
All variables are as defined in the “Appendix”. The sample period is between 2003 and 2014. The depend-
ent variables are the proxies of firm performance, which are represented by ROA, ROE, ROS, TOBIN_Q 
and OPNIC, respectively. To reduce the effects of multicollinearity, the component variables of the inter-
action terms are standardized before being entered into the regression analysis. This paper uses industry 
Dependent variable ROA ROE ROS TOBIN_Q OPNIC
MF_PER 0.332*** 0.683*** 0.562*** 3.353*** 0.275***
(19.365) (17.558) (10.535) (10.084) (19.570)
MF_PER_2 − 0.663*** − 1.403*** − 1.627*** − 0.922 − 0.849***
(− 9.524) (− 9.516) (− 7.623) (− 0.670) (− 16.064)
TUL − 0.110*** − 0.179*** − 0.229*** 1.611*** − 0.053***
(− 5.232) (− 3.074) (− 3.457) (4.396) (− 3.668)
TUL*MF_PER 0.003** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.043** 0.005***
(2.351) (3.509) (3.582) (2.198) (5.565)
TUL*MF_PER_2 − 0.002*** − 0.006*** − 0.008*** − 0.029** − 0.002***
(− 2.614) (− 3.669) (− 3.601) (− 2.518) (− 3.911)
PAY 0.010*** 0.021*** 0.014*** − 0.008 0.007***
(14.567) (13.915) (6.339) (− 0.881) (13.198)
TOP_1 0.035*** 0.073*** 0.017** 0.160*** 0.028***
(13.367) (12.589) (1.995) (3.659) (12.020)
IND − 0.016** − 0.027* − 0.023 0.622*** − 0.010
(− 2.192) (− 1.727) (− 0.974) (5.318) (− 1.569)
DSUP_NUM 0.005** 0.008* 0.014** 0.063*** 0.004**
(2.220) (1.680) (2.120) (2.634) (2.426)
BIG4 0.006*** 0.008** 0.004 0.150*** 0.007***
(3.658) (2.534) (0.705) (6.151) (4.210)
TS − 0.006*** − 0.017*** − 0.040*** 0.193*** − 0.007***
(− 3.407) (− 4.423) (− 6.893) (5.509) (− 4.260)
REFORM 0.009*** 0.020*** 0.043*** − 0.020 0.012***
(8.601) (8.799) (13.178) (− 1.037) (12.213)
RET_ADJ 0.012*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.280*** 0.008***
(13.127) (12.345) (8.121) (15.809) (10.019)
STATE − 0.006*** − 0.013*** − 0.016*** − 0.041*** − 0.005***
(− 6.496) (− 6.528) (− 5.892) (− 2.972) (− 6.980)
LEVERAGE − 0.084*** − 0.051*** − 0.182*** − 1.454*** − 0.043***
(− 33.914) (− 8.877) (− 21.167) (− 30.193) (− 21.333)
SGR 0.033*** 0.066*** 0.066*** − 0.008 0.025***
(17.917) (15.284) (7.882) (− 0.360) (18.358)
BM − 0.013*** − 0.023*** − 0.007 − 1.162*** 0.012***
(− 6.165) (− 4.842) (− 1.123) (− 16.473) (6.035)
FIRMSIZE 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.015*** − 0.252*** 0.006***
(4.928) (5.320) (8.388) (− 21.082) (13.561)
Intercept 0.010 − 0.063** − 0.037 7.483*** − 0.095***
(0.875) (− 2.517) (− 1.035) (33.470) (− 9.827)
Year dummy Y Y Y Y Y
Industry dummy Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.393 0.299 0.259 0.603 0.291
Observations 13,960 13,904 13,960 13,960 13,960
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is concave.24 As a result, below a certain threshold, mutual funds have a more positive 
effect on firm performance when firms suffer from heavier tunneling. However, when pass-
ing the threshold, mutual funds have a more negative effect on firm performance if these 
firms engage in more severe tunneling activities.25
5.3  Unexplained tunneling
In this section, we discuss our results based upon the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) 
approach to mitigate the endogeneity concern that tunneling, mutual fund ownership, and 
firm performance might be affected by some unobservable factors. Panel A of Table  6 
reports the first stage estimation results based upon Model (4), with the residual capturing 
the unexplained tunneling (UNEXP_TUL). The coefficient on TUL_LAG is significantly 
positive, suggesting that controlling shareholders conduct tunneling persistently over time. 
In panel B of Table 6, we report the second-stage estimation results based upon Model (3) 
by replacing TUL with unexpected tunneling. The coefficients on the mutual fund owner-
ship measure (MF_PER) are positive and significant, and the coefficients on the squared 
value of mutual fund ownership variable (MF_PER_2) are in general negative and sig-
nificant (except when using Tobin’s Q to measure firm performance). The coefficients on 
the interaction term between UNEXP_TUL and MF_PER are significantly positive across 
all firm performance indicators, while the coefficients on the interaction term between 
UNEXP_TUL and MF_PER_2 are consistently negative, but significant when using ROA, 
ROE and OPNIC as firm performance measures.26 Overall, these results support our con-
clusion that mutual fund ownership can be effective in monitoring firm management and 
thus improving firm performance, and this effect is stronger within firms with severe tun-
neling, as long as mutual fund ownership does not pass a certain threshold.
6  Other robustness checks
In this section, we adopt several checks to examine the robustness and sensitivity of our 
results. These include the adoption of an alternative proxy for tunneling, the employment 
of industry-adjusted firm performance measures, the use of firm fixed effects, the inclusion 
24 For a robustness check, we use an alternative measure of mutual fund ownership which is computed as 
the market value of mutual fund shares divided by the total market value of the listed firm. The results are 
highly consistent with those in Table 5 and support our H2 and H3 (a) and (b) about the effect of mutual 
fund ownership on promoting firm performance. The results are not reported for brevity, but are available 
upon request.
25 We also estimate the regressions in Table 5 by replacing the tunneling measure (TUL) with the likeli-
hood of heavy tunneling activities (DTUL), and the results remain materially unchanged. These results are 
not reported for brevity, but are available upon request.
26 We also use the alternative measure for mutual fund ownership (MF_MV_PER) and industry-adjusted 
firm performance proxies in our 2SLS analysis. The results are materially unchanged. For brevity, the 
results are available upon request.
dummies to control for the industry effect according to the CSRC industrial codes, and controls for the 
year dummy as well. The coefficients and t-stats are computed using heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors. T statistics are in parentheses; *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 6  2SLS sensitivity tests
Dependent variable TUL
Panel A: the determinants of tunneling behavior
TOP_1 − 0.003*
(− 1.933)
STATE − 0.001**
(− 2.085)
ROA_LAG − 0.038***
(− 4.235)
LEVERAGE 0.017***
(7.957)
BM − 0.001
(− 0.846)
FIRMSIZE − 0.003***
(− 9.381)
TUL_LAG 0.761***
(48.614)
Intercept 0.062***
(11.192)
R-squared 0.622
Observations 14,742
Dependent variable ROA ROE ROS TOBIN_Q OPNIC
Panel B: relation between mutual fund ownership, tunneling behavior and firm performance (evidence 
from unexplained tunneling)
MF_PER 0.268*** 0.565*** 0.462*** 2.760*** 0.227***
(13.985) (13.182) (7.662) (7.437) (13.897)
MF_PER_2 − 0.457*** − 0.943*** − 1.394*** 0.288 − 0.668***
(− 6.078) (− 5.785) (− 6.046) (0.187) (− 10.782)
UNEXP_TUL − 0.004*** − 0.012*** − 0.019*** 0.081*** − 0.003***
(− 3.186) (− 4.300) (− 4.524) (4.739) (− 2.841)
UNEXP_TUL*MF_PER 0.214*** 0.363*** 0.345*** 1.009* 0.147***
(6.459) (5.217) (3.271) (1.685) (5.395)
UNEXP_TUL*MF_PER_2 − 0.618*** − 1.221*** − 0.648 − 0.962 − 0.536***
(− 4.565) (− 4.461) (− 1.499) (− 0.361) (− 5.019)
PAY 0.010*** 0.022*** 0.015*** − 0.008 0.007***
(14.739) (14.235) (6.734) (− 0.921) (13.479)
TOP_1 0.039*** 0.082*** 0.028*** 0.140*** 0.031***
(14.616) (13.785) (3.287) (3.243) (12.987)
IND − 0.018** − 0.029* − 0.024 0.622*** − 0.011*
(− 2.374) (− 1.800) (− 1.006) (5.340) (− 1.678)
DSUP_NUM 0.006*** 0.011** 0.018** 0.060** 0.006***
(2.719) (2.161) (2.541) (2.506) (2.901)
BIG4 0.005*** 0.008** 0.004 0.139*** 0.006***
(3.379) (2.486) (0.715) (5.736) (4.128)
TS − 0.007*** − 0.020*** − 0.044*** 0.199*** − 0.008***
(− 4.007) (− 5.044) (− 7.376) (5.725) (− 4.781)
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of a marketization index measure (MKT) in Model (4) when computing the unexpected 
tunneling and the implementation of panel-data Granger causality tests.
6.1  Alternative measurements of the tunneling proxy
Although Jiang et  al. (2010) and Li (2010) suggest that firms’ overall other receivables 
obtained from the financial statement can approximately represent firms’ tunneling activi-
ties, a few other studies adopt alternative measures to capture such behavior. For example, 
Ye (2006) and Wang and Xiao (2011) manually collected other receivables of controlling 
shareholders and their affiliates from the footnotes of financial statements to proxy for tun-
neling. Therefore, we also adopt this definition of tunneling by using other receivables of 
controlling shareholder as identified by the China Listed Firms’ Related Party Transac-
tions Research Database in CSMAR. The correlation matrix in Table 2 shows a significant 
Table 6  (continued)
Dependent variable ROA ROE ROS TOBIN_Q OPNIC
REFORM 0.009*** 0.020*** 0.044*** − 0.023 0.012***
(8.697) (8.849) (13.298) (− 1.207) (12.348)
RET_ADJ 0.013*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.278*** 0.008***
(13.322) (12.608) (8.478) (15.720) (10.394)
STATE − 0.005*** − 0.012*** − 0.015*** − 0.045*** − 0.005***
(− 6.077) (− 5.997) (− 5.459) (− 3.254) (− 6.601)
LEVERAGE − 0.089*** − 0.067*** − 0.203*** − 1.336*** − 0.047***
(− 35.022) (− 10.757) (− 23.010) (− 26.398) (− 23.151)
SGR 0.036*** 0.072*** 0.073*** − 0.012 0.028***
(19.031) (16.379) (8.676) (− 0.546) (19.936)
BM − 0.009*** − 0.016*** 0.003 − 1.158*** 0.015***
(− 4.391) (− 3.536) (0.384) (− 16.671) (7.509)
FIRMSIZE 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.017*** − 0.269*** 0.007***
(5.603) (6.450) (9.370) (− 21.629) (14.202)
Intercept − 0.004 − 0.103*** − 0.092** 7.837*** − 0.105***
(− 0.372) (− 4.000) (− 2.484) (33.759) (− 10.828)
Year dummy Y Y Y Y Y
Industry dummy Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.379 0.279 0.245 0.604 0.277
Observations 13,960 13,904 13,960 13,960 13,960
Panel A: All variables are as defined in the “Appendix”. The sample period is between 2003 and 2014. The 
dependent variable is the proxy of tunneling behavior, calculated by the other receivable deflated by total 
assets. This paper uses industry dummies to control for the industry effect according to the CSRC industrial 
codes, and controls for the year dummy as well. The coefficients and t-stats are computed using heterosce-
dasticity consistent standard errors. T statistics are in parentheses; *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Panel B: All variables are as defined in the “Appendix”. The sample period is between 2003 and 2014. 
The dependent variables are the proxies of firm performance, which are represented by ROA, ROE, ROS, 
TOBIN_Q and OPNIC, respectively. This paper uses industry dummies to control for the industry effect 
according to the CSRC industrial codes, and controls for the year dummy as well. The coefficients and 
t-stats are computed using heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. T statistics are in parentheses; 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 7  Relation between mutual fund ownership, tunneling behavior and firm performance (robustness 
tests with controlling shareholders’ other receivables as tunneling proxy)
All variables are as defined in the “Appendix”. The sample period is between 2003 and 2014. The depend-
ent variables are the proxies of firm performance, which are represented by ROA, ROE, ROS, TOBIN_Q 
and OPNIC, respectively. To reduce the effects of multicollinearity the component variables of the inter-
Dependent variable ROA ROE ROS TOBIN_Q OPNIC
MF_PER 0.361*** 0.810*** 0.648*** 2.825*** 0.336***
(14.184) (13.412) (8.481) (6.514) (15.540)
MF_PER_2 − 0.782*** − 1.875*** − 1.942*** − 0.510 − 1.070***
(− 7.488) (− 7.924) (− 6.314) (− 0.268) (− 13.019)
TUL − 0.078** − 0.181* − 0.001 1.523*** − 0.039*
(− 2.148) (− 1.787) (− 0.008) (2.784) (− 1.700)
TUL*MF_PER 0.008*** 0.017*** 0.032*** 0.061*** 0.006***
(4.088) (3.244) (5.848) (2.629) (5.206)
TUL*MF_PER_2 − 0.002*** − 0.007*** − 0.013*** − 0.020 − 0.003***
(− 2.670) (− 2.600) (− 5.366) (− 1.411) (− 4.989)
PAY 0.010*** 0.022*** 0.017*** − 0.001 0.006***
(10.306) (9.652) (5.795) (− 0.092) (9.024)
TOP_1 0.040*** 0.089*** 0.044*** − 0.009 0.034***
(10.921) (10.395) (3.623) (− 0.185) (9.856)
IND − 0.021* − 0.039 − 0.038 0.583*** − 0.013
(− 1.896) (− 1.565) (− 1.066) (3.969) (− 1.272)
DSUP_NUM 0.006** 0.012* 0.017* 0.032 0.005**
(2.180) (1.909) (1.944) (1.256) (2.020)
BIG4 0.008*** 0.015*** 0.012* 0.055** 0.010***
(3.883) (3.665) (1.705) (2.168) (5.161)
TS − 0.009*** − 0.022*** − 0.044*** 0.110** − 0.008***
(− 3.642) (− 3.720) (− 5.093) (2.274) (− 2.906)
REFORM 0.012*** 0.029*** 0.051*** − 0.048* 0.012***
(8.188) (8.408) (10.282) (− 1.917) (8.408)
RET_ADJ 0.012*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.267*** 0.009***
(9.092) (8.922) (5.406) (11.255) (7.531)
STATE − 0.003*** − 0.009*** − 0.012*** − 0.023 − 0.004***
(− 2.686) (− 3.241) (− 3.103) (− 1.280) (− 3.647)
LEVERAGE − 0.083*** − 0.057*** − 0.179*** − 1.149*** − 0.047***
(− 24.055) (− 6.643) (− 14.991) (− 17.682) (− 16.399)
SGR 0.036*** 0.075*** 0.084*** − 0.036 0.027***
(15.557) (12.792) (8.041) (− 1.310) (15.380)
BM − 0.007*** − 0.006 0.009 − 0.853*** 0.012***
(− 2.874) (− 0.944) (1.104) (− 10.913) (4.939)
FIRMSIZE 0.002*** 0.004** 0.011*** − 0.239*** 0.006***
(2.915) (2.468) (4.711) (− 16.469) (9.347)
Intercept 0.012 − 0.307*** − 0.092* 7.074*** − 0.094***
(0.842) (− 7.384) (− 1.916) (25.297) (− 7.252)
Year dummy Y Y Y Y Y
Industry dummy Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.401 0.304 0.286 0.576 0.320
Observations 7190 7144 7190 7190 7190
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positive relation between other receivables from a firm as a whole and from controlling 
shareholders only. This implies a reasonable substitution for these two measures as the 
proxy of tunneling as documented in the literature. The results reported in Table 7 compare 
well to those reported in Table 5 and thus support our conjecture that the exogenous effect 
of mutual funds’ monitoring can effectively constrain the tunneling behavior of controlling 
shareholders and in turn improve firms’ performance. The improvement is seen more in 
firms with higher tunneling, but becomes weaker after a certain threshold level. 
6.2  Re‑estimating the unexplained tunneling
Jiang et  al. (2010) and Wang and Xiao (2011) both test the determinants of tunneling 
behavior with the same set of factors: ROA, STATE, SIZE, LEVERAGE, MARKETIZATION 
INDEX, and LARGEST SHAREHOLDER. Following Fan and Wang (2011), Wang and 
Xiao (2011) include a marketization index as one of the determinants for tunneling to cap-
ture the development of the regional market in which the firm is located. As a robustness 
check, we add in this variable and redo the analysis by adopting a shorter sample period 
from 2003 to 2009, given that the index is only available until 2009. The results reported in 
Table 8 are generally consistent with our previous findings.27
6.3  Endogenous or exogenous effect of mutual fund ownership
Jiang et al. (2010) argue that mutual fund managers may select firms with fewer tunneling 
activities to be included in their investment portfolios to gain higher returns. As a con-
sequence, we further examine the causal relationship between the tunneling behavior and 
mutual fund ownership over our whole sample period using panel vector autoregression 
with GMM estimation, although we already control for the impact of stock returns or tun-
neling at t − 1 in the previous regressions.28 We use firm size and return-on-assets and their 
combinations with two or all of the following variables including Top_1, leverage, and 
Book-to-Market ratio as various sets of control variables in the VAR system. The results 
reported in Table 9 show that the changes in mutual fund ownership would Granger-cause 
the changes in tunneling behavior, but the null hypothesis that tunneling does not Granger-
cause mutual fund ownership is only rejected in one of the tests (based upon p < 0.05). 
action terms are standardized before being entered into the regression analysis. This paper uses industry 
dummies to control for the industry effect according to the CSRC industrial codes, and controls for the 
year dummy as well. The coefficients and t-stats are computed using heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors. T statistics are in parentheses; *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 7  (continued)
27 We also use the market value of mutual fund and industry-adjusted firm performance proxies together 
with MARKETIZATION INDEX to test our H2 and H3 (a) and (b) and the results are materially unchanged. 
For brevity, the results are not reported but available upon request.
28 We use the value of AIC to decide the number of lags for the variables in the VAR system.
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Table 8  2SLS sensitivity tests
Dependent variable TUL
Panel A: the determinants of tunneling (robustness tests with MAK)
TOP_1 0.001
(0.338)
STATE − 0.004***
(− 3.246)
ROA_LAG − 0.029**
(− 2.159)
LEVERAGE 0.026***
(6.283)
BM − 0.000
(− 0.253)
FIRMSIZE − 0.004***
(− 7.587)
TUL_LAG 0.787***
(41.070)
MAK − 0.001***
(− 3.278)
Intercept 0.089***
(8.932)
R-squared 0.646
Observations 5915
Dependent variable ROA ROE ROS TOBIN_Q OPNIC
Panel B: relation between mutual fund ownership, tunneling behavior and firm performance (evidence 
from unexplained tunneling)
MF_PER 0.326*** 0.691*** 0.601*** 0.560 0.265***
(10.498) (9.782) (6.470) (1.207) (10.678)
MF_PER_2 − 0.722*** − 1.532*** − 2.092*** 5.482*** − 0.833***
(− 6.164) (− 5.908) (− 6.011) (2.611) (− 9.069)
UNEXP_TUL − 0.013*** − 0.033*** − 0.042*** − 0.004 − 0.010***
(− 6.189) (− 6.965) (− 6.363) (− 0.230) (− 6.035)
UNEXP_TUL* MF_PER 0.234*** 0.397*** 0.487*** − 0.614 0.226***
(4.791) (3.748) (3.113) (− 0.887) (5.836)
UNEXP_TUL*MF_PER_2 − 0.587*** − 1.058*** − 0.788 5.727* − 0.764***
(− 3.059) (− 2.636) (− 1.258) (1.755) (− 5.153)
PAY 0.010*** 0.022*** 0.018*** − 0.002 0.008***
(11.963) (11.396) (6.460) (− 0.195) (12.486)
TOP_1 0.029*** 0.060*** − 0.005 0.061 0.027***
(6.009) (5.419) (− 0.337) (1.120) (6.665)
IND 0.003 0.010 − 0.013 0.004 − 0.003
(0.169) (0.297) (− 0.266) (0.028) (− 0.225)
DSUP_NUM 0.006** 0.012** 0.014* 0.018 0.006***
(2.542) (2.134) (1.871) (1.090) (3.009)
BIG4 0.006** 0.009* 0.013* 0.005 0.005**
(2.509) (1.709) (1.727) (0.222) (2.372)
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6.4  Adjusted measurements of firm performance and firm fixed effects
Given that firm performance may systematically vary across different industries, we also 
control for the industry effects. Following Allayannis and Weston (2001), Woidtke (2002), 
and Yuan et  al. (2008), we compute industry-adjusted firm performance proxies which 
are defined as the difference between a firm’s performance and its corresponding industry 
median in the same year. The results are consistent and support our hypotheses H2 and 
H3 (a) and (b). In addition, following Bond and Meghir (1994) and Harrison and McMil-
lan (2003), we also estimate the multivariate panel regressions with firm fixed effects. The 
Panel A: All variables are as defined in the “Appendix”. The sample period is between 2003 and 2009. The 
dependent variable is the proxy of tunneling behavior, calculated by the other receivable deflated by total 
assets. This paper uses industry dummies to control for the industry effect according to the CSRC industrial 
codes, and controls for the year dummy as well. The coefficients and t-stats are computed using heterosce-
dasticity-consistent standard errors. T statistics are in parentheses; *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Panel B: All variables are as defined in the “Appendix”. The sample period is between 2003 and 2014. 
The dependent variables are the proxies of firm performance, which are represented by ROA, ROE, ROS, 
TOBIN_Q and OPNIC, respectively. This paper uses industry dummies to control for the industry effect 
according to the CSRC industrial codes, and controls for the year dummy as well. The coefficients and 
t-stats are computed using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. T statistics are in parentheses; 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 8  (continued)
Dependent variable ROA ROE ROS TOBIN_Q OPNIC
TS − 0.026*** − 0.057*** − 0.090*** 0.536*** − 0.023***
(− 5.414) (− 5.347) (− 5.767) (8.303) (− 5.723)
REFORM 0.014*** 0.034*** 0.050*** 0.012 0.016***
(6.086) (7.005) (7.403) (0.484) (8.289)
RET_ADJ 0.012*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.196*** 0.007***
(7.988) (7.014) (5.227) (9.778) (5.321)
STATE − 0.005*** − 0.009*** − 0.007 − 0.043** − 0.005***
(− 3.483) (− 2.873) (− 1.532) (− 2.545) (− 4.061)
LEVERAGE − 0.089*** − 0.080*** − 0.222*** − 0.898*** − 0.066***
(− 21.500) (− 8.270) (− 14.902) (− 16.648) (− 20.579)
SGR 0.038*** 0.080*** 0.089*** − 0.016 0.031***
(14.259) (12.609) (7.930) (− 0.727) (16.392)
BM − 0.004 − 0.011 0.016 − 0.779*** 0.001
(− 1.035) (− 1.268) (1.254) (− 24.058) (0.175)
FIRMSIZE 0.001 0.004** 0.014*** − 0.170*** 0.005***
(0.886) (2.267) (4.956) (− 15.720) (6.413)
Intercept − 0.077*** − 0.272*** − 0.201*** 5.370*** − 0.138***
(− 3.884) (− 6.279) (− 3.207) (23.060) (− 8.691)
Year dummy Y Y Y Y Y
Industry dummy Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.408 0.319 0.305 0.606 0.358
Observations 5898 5858 5898 5898 5898
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results do not alter our conclusions. For brevity, the results are not reported but available 
upon request.29
7  Conclusion
Extant studies indicate that mutual funds play an effective corporate governance role in 
protecting minority shareholders’ interests in the developed markets. However, the cor-
porate governance role of mutual funds remains inconclusive and questionable in the 
emerging market context. Despite the fact that China experienced rapid growth of mutual 
funds in the last decade, whether and, if so, how mutual fund ownership improves firms’ 
performance in the Chinese market remains unclear. Since the Chinese market has a less 
developed legal system, weak investor protection and high ownership concentration, the 
main agency issue in such a market is the tunneling behavior conducted by controlling 
shareholders that expropriates minority shareholders. Unlike the situation in the US, the 
governance mechanisms of the mutual funds industry in China remain weaker. Conse-
quently, our study finds that mutual funds can reduce the likelihood of tunneling behavior 
of controlling shareholders and enhance firm performance, and thus, serve as an effective 
external governance mechanism as long as the ownership of mutual funds does not exceed 
a certain point. In addition, we find that mutual fund managers with highly concentrated 
ownership are more likely to collude with controlling shareholders to expropriate minority 
shareholders for their own interests and, consequently, diminish firm performance. Further-
more, regarding the moderating effect of mutual fund ownership, our results show that the 
monitoring effects of mutual funds are stronger for firms that are more likely to suffer from 
Table 9  Granger causality tests for the relation between mutual fund ownership and tunneling behavior
All variables are as defined in the “Appendix”. The sample period is between 2003 and 2014. The Granger 
causality tests are implemented using panel vector autoregression (VAR) with GMM estimation. The value 
of AIC is used to decide the number of lags for the variables in the VAR system
Null hypotheses Chi2 Prob > chi2
Control variables: FIRMSIZE, ROA,TOP_1, LEVERAGE
 TUL do not Granger cause MF_PER 3.939 0.047
 MF_PER do not Granger cause TUL 7.402 0.007
Control variables: FIRMSIZE, ROA, TOP_1, BM
 TUL do not Granger cause MF_PER 2.648 0.104
 MF_PER do not Granger cause TUL 12.005 0.001
Control variables: FIRMSIZE, ROA, BM, LEVERAGE
 TUL do not Granger cause MF_PER 2.421 0.120
 MF_PER do not Granger cause TUL 9.676 0.002
Control variables: FIRMSIZE, ROA, BM, LEVERAGE, TOP_1
 TUL do not Granger cause MF_PER 3.703 0.054
 MF_PER do not Granger cause TUL 11.015 0.001
29 We also estimate the multivariate panel regressions with standard errors clustered by firm, and the 
results are consistent. For brevity, the results are not reported but available upon request.
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agency problems—i.e. firms experiencing more tunneling activities of controlling share-
holders—but the monitoring effects of concentrated mutual funds are weakened.
Apart from the timeliness and relevance of the subject, our paper adds to the limited 
body of literature on the governance role of mutual funds in emerging economies in gen-
eral and in China, in particular. Moreover, our findings offer useful insights and policy 
implications to policy makers and regulators for the development of mutual funds in China 
and other emerging markets. In particular, the authorities may consider setting policies or 
regulations that can strike a balance between promoting mutual funds as a corporate gov-
ernance mechanism and achieving the monitoring effects while facing the challenges of 
high levels of ownership concentration, a less developed legal system, and weak minority 
shareholder protection. Finally, the question about whether the foreign mutual funds can 
have stronger monitoring effects than domestic mutual funds on controlling shareholders’ 
expropriation in the emerging market context is beyond the scope of this study but could be 
of interest to future researchers.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix
Variable definition
ROA Earnings before interests and tax divided by total assets
ROA_ADJ Adjusted industry-median ROA, which is the difference between firm’s ROA and 
industry-median
ROE Total profit divided by book value of equity
ROE_ADJ Adjusted industry-median ROE, which is the difference between firm’s ROE and 
industry-median
TOBIN_Q Market value of assets over book value of assets
TOBIN_Q_ADJ Adjusted industry-median TOBIN_Q, which is the difference between firm’s TOBIN_Q 
and industry-median
ROS Earnings before interests and tax divided by net sales
ROS_ADJ Adjusted industry-median ROS, which is the difference between firm’s ROS and 
industry-median
OPINC_MV Operating Income divided by market value of assets
OPINC_MV_ADJ Adjusted industry-median OPINC_MV, which is the difference between firm’s OPINC_
MV and industry-median
MF_PER Institutional investor’s ownership, which is calculated by the ratio of the number of 
shares held by mutual funds to the total number of shares in issue
MF_MV_PER Another institutional investor’ s ownership, which is calculated by the ratio of the mar-
ket value of shares held by mutual funds to the total market value of a firm
TUL Other receivables deflated by total assets
DTUL A dummy variable assigned to 1 if the firm’s TUL is over the average value in the cur-
rent year, and 0 otherwise
TUL_LAR Other receivables obtained from firm’s controlling shareholders and its affiliates 
deflated by total assets
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DTUL_LAR A dummy variable assigned to 1 if firm’s TUL_LAR is over current year median value, 
and 0 otherwise
PAY Natural logarithm of total compensation received by board of directors, supervisors and 
executives
TOP_1 Percentage of shareholdings held by the largest shareholder
IND The ratio of independent directors on the board
DSUP_NUM A dummy variable assigned to 1 if the number of supervisors in a firm is above the 
median value of our sampled firms in the current year and 0 otherwise
BIG_4 A dummy variable assigned to 1 if a listed firm is audited by one of the international 
Big Four audit firms or their joint ventures in China, and 0 otherwise
TS The ratio of tradable shares divided by total shares
REFORM Dummy variable equal to 1 for the period when a listed firm was chosen to complete 
the SSSREF, 0 otherwise
RET_ADJ Market-adjusted annual stock return, which is the difference between firm’s stock return 
and annual market stock return
STATE A dummy variable equal to 1 if the state shareholder is the largest shareholder, and 0 
otherwise
LEVERAGE Leverage calculated as total debt divided by total assets
SGR The ratio of change of sales divided by sales of current year
BM Book-to-market ratio calculated as book value of common equity over market capitali-
zation
FIRMSIZE Firm size computed as the natural logarithm of total assets
MAK A comprehensive index measuring the development of the regional market in which 
the firm is registered (see Fan and Wang 2011), where higher values indicate greater 
regional market development
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